The memorandum of understanding signed with Washington plans to grant Iran sums equivalent to its GDP, via access to its frozen assets and the creation of a reconstruction fund, sparking debate and uncertainty.
The memorandum of understanding which has just been signed with Washington plans to grant considerable sums to Iran. This text, described as a “quasi-Marshall Plan” granted to a single country, promises Tehran global financial support equivalent to its gross domestic product, or nearly 400 billion dollars last year. This envelope, which represents almost twice the sums paid by the United States to Ukraine since the Russian invasion in 2022, marks a major turning point in the management of the consequences of the conflict which struck Iran.
Beyond the unconstrained sale of Iranian oil for two months, the deal opens the way to broader sanctions relief, access to Iranian funds frozen abroad and a potential fund for Iran’s “reconstruction and economic development” of $300 billion. This is the equivalent of Iran’s gross domestic product (GDP), which amounted to nearly $400 billion last year, which represents a global promise.
Origin and terms of funds
The exact origin and terms of payment of these sums are unclear. Tehran makes the unfreezing of Iranian assets a non-negotiable point. Between 100 and 120 billion dollars in oil revenues or financial assets blocked by American and international sanctions are now in bank accounts abroad. A first release of 24 billion could take place, according to sources, within two months, half of which very quickly.
For the majority of the jackpot, the fund dedicated to the reconstruction of infrastructure and the revival of the Iranian economy, vagueness reigns. The American president assured Monday that the payment of 300 billion by the United States to Iran was “false information, spread by the Democrats”. Those close to the American president do not dispute the amount but insist that this money will not come from American taxpayers.
Vice President JD Vance said this on CBS News. He said the fund, which should only be released if Iran definitively ends its nuclear program, is “the kind of thing, funded by the Gulf Coast Coalition,” that the Iranians “could have access to.” “We would invite other countries – not us, but other countries – to invest in Iran,” he insisted. Half of the sum has already found investors for this plan, which should be financed by the private sector in the Gulf and East Asia.
Conditions and debates around the plan
This quasi-Marshall plan granted to a single country, granted by the aggressor to his victim, would bring him, if deployed over ten years, the equivalent of 7% to 8% of his annual GDP. It would make it possible to rehabilitate the infrastructures most damaged by the war.
In the energy and petrochemical sectors, where attacks targeted the main production centers of Assalouyé and Mahchahr, the time horizon for repairing the damage is at least five years. In water and electricity which, according to the Iranian Minister of Energy, “have suffered heavy damage”, it will undoubtedly be faster. Reconstructions are also expected in industry where, in April, Tehran recorded more than 3,000 affected sites, more than 15% of which were destroyed, as well as in the civil sector where tens of thousands of buildings, including sanitary facilities, were destroyed.
On April 13, when the war had only lasted a month and a half, the Iranian government spokesperson put the damage linked to the war at around $270 billion. More recently, the Trump Administration cited, among other figures, a cost of reparations of $1 trillion.
Economic and social issues
Iran is emerging from this conflict with a deeply fractured economy: 60% of the population now lives below the poverty line, with annual inflation reaching 53.9% and point-to-point inflation of 77.2%. In this context, a reconstruction plan of 300 billion could above all become a new external income to be allocated to public contracts, concessions, infrastructure projects.
In practice, it will be a vast field of competition between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its conglomerates (construction, energy, telecoms, etc.), “reformist” or pragmatic technocrats and networks close to the guide and major religious foundations. The first will seek to position themselves as essential interlocutors for foreign companies, the second would like to condition access to new funds on governance reforms, while the third will make control of the distribution of these contracts an instrument of political loyalty.
