French and European technological sovereignty is hampered by ultra-regulation, the weakness of public procurement and the lack of investment compared to the United States.
The ups and downs of the transatlantic relationship will at least have had the advantage of provoking a collective awakening. The digital sector in particular crystallizes Franco-American tensions as technological resilience and economic competitiveness are now law. These imperatives have in fact become inseparable from the question of sovereignty, undermined by the unpredictability of the Trump presidency. Except that the observed loss of control, already revealed during the pandemic, has also revived economic patriotism. Whether it is French, European, or even both at the same time. It still needs to be translated into action.
French sovereignty: dictated by the EU?
If it amused more than one, the little phrase “for sure” uttered by our President in Davos on the subject of European economic-technological capacity is above all the admission of what is lacking in Europe: it is too slow, too complex and too poorly adapted to today’s world. It is no longer able to compete with the United States, which captured 44% of global industrial investments announced in 2025, particularly in AI and the cloud, compared to 14% for Europe.[1]. How can we explain such disparities?
Certain factors are attributable to administrative complexity and the tendency towards ultra-regulation which characterizes European functioning. The adage “the United States innovates and Europe regulates” has never been more true. And we must add to this the lack of competitiveness that we encounter in terms of investments: “tech” companies that manage to go beyond the scale of France are often forced to turn to American investors with capacities seven times greater than those of Europe. Without forgetting that if our startups are slow to “take off”, they owe it to a clear reluctance to invest in technologies that are still (too) immature. But how could they develop them if they do not receive adequate support?
So, whose fault is it? Europe, its member states or both? The balance between European and national efforts appears shaky, due to the lack of a clearly defined strategy. To gain in attractiveness, I tell everyone their reserved area!
Is France afraid of showing a preference?
Not unrelated to the “pro-startups” policy defended by Emmanuel Macron, France is among the most active European countries in terms of technological sovereignty and competitiveness. It certainly has successes – Mistral AI not to mention – but certainly too few to still be considered a global challenger. Our startups operate in a market of limited size, and their successes remain regional (Alan, Doctolib, etc.). Elsewhere, the thing is quite different: in Israel the local scale serves as a “beta” phase, before launching in the United States; in China, the gigantic nature of the market allows it to be self-sufficient. And the American market, with its 270 million English speakers and a shared culture, is naturally more favorable to the emergence of world leaders.
European fragmentation limits the effect of scale, but there are also endogenous factors in this French evil. The reasons are multiple but the crux of the problem remains the weakness of public procurement. SpaceX, supported by NASA, has become a world champion. Did we have the same preference? Not really, even though France is a pioneer in many future technologies (quantum computers, nuclear power). So should we, for example, force EDF to enter into contracts with nuclear startups? Will we finally learn the necessary lessons and live up to our ambitions?
Our companies also have their share of responsibility
Our companies are tired of being more easily granted (and again) subsidies or aid for innovation rather than having access to public markets – and the sustainability that accompanies it. And faced with a tax framework considered restrictive, some entrepreneurs are considering relocation. This is the whole nature of the debate launched during the proposal of the Zucman tax, which had the merit of both questioning the scope left to the French entrepreneurial impulse and of exposing the companies which refuse to play the game even though they have the means. Like Criteo, which recently confirmed its Luxembourg and then American ambitions. Building sovereignty requires that those who benefit from it contribute to it.
Regardless of those who tend to oppose them, French sovereignty and European sovereignty are inseparable. The debates around our resilience therefore urgently need to be understood using a global approach because the current situation has amply demonstrated that France, the 27 and Europe can no longer afford the luxury of soft ambivalence. There is an urgent need to (re)define everyone’s roles.
[1] 2026 barometer of global industrial investments.
